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THE ROLE OF THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN
PREVENTING AND PUNISHING HATE CRIMES
THROUGH CIVIL PROSECUTIONS: POSITIVE
EXPERIENCES AND POSSIBLE FIRST AMENDMENT
POTHOLES
Amy Dieterich*

I. INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 2006, Lewiston, Maine resident Brent Matthews threw a pig’s head as
“a joke” into the town’s only mosque, frequented primarily by Somali refugees, during
evening services.1 Matthews presumably chose a pig’s head because pigs are
considered “dirty” in Islamic culture, and the Qu’ran forbids believers from eating its
meat. Because of Matthews’ “joke,” members of the mosque were required by Islamic
law to clean the desecrated area seven times, attendance at the mosque decreased, and
some members said they feared physical harm.2 Mosque members also told reporters
that the investigating officers treated the incident as a joke, with one even going so far
as to say “I wish I had thought of that.”3
Unfortunately for Matthews, Maine is one of eight states that has given its
Attorney General the authority to seek a civil remedy for a violation of a citizen’s civil
rights, which can be pursued concurrently or exclusively of criminal charges. Two
weeks after the incident, Maine Attorney General Steven Rowe announced that his
office had filed a civil action against Matthews under the Maine Civil Rights Act,
asking the court to order Matthews not to have any contact with the mosque or its
members, and to obey the Maine Civil Rights Act.4 In a press release announcing
Matthews’ prosecution, Attorney General Rowe opined that “[a]s a civil society and
one governed by the rule of law, it is our obligation to take the legal steps necessary
to make sure that Maine people who practice Islam and people of all other faiths feel
completely free and safe to worship without violent interference from others.”5
In contrast to the government’s account of the event, Matthews claimed in his
defense that he spoke with a member of the Lewiston Police Department before his
“joke” and asked what charges he could face. Matthews claimed the officer told him

* Associate, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP; J.D., Columbia University School of
Law, 2008. I would like to thank Former Maine Attorney General and Professor James Tierney for his
extraordinary help and guidance with this Article. Without his wealth of knowledge—both academic and
practical—this Article could not have been written.
1. Lindsay Tice, Another Side of Brent Matthews, SUN J., Apr. 29, 2007, at A8.
2. Christopher Williams, State Files Bias Suit, SUN J., Jul. 21, 2006, at A1.
3. Christopher Williams, Pig’s Head Suspect: I Asked Cop, SUN J., Aug. 8, 2006, at A1. A police
spokesperson said that the Lewiston Police Department was not treating the issue lightly. Id.
4. See Press Release, Me. Attorney Gen., AG Rowe Files Civil Rights Action Against Lewiston Man
For Throwing Pig’s Head into Mosque (Jul. 20, 2006), available at http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/i
ndex.php?topic=AGOffice_Press&id=48457&v=article.
5. Id.
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that he could face only littering and improper disposal of body parts charges.6
However, the referenced police officer disputed Matthews’ depiction of their
conversation and has said that he told Matthews he could possibly be guilty of a hate
crime and advised Matthews not to do anything with the pig’s head.7 Matthews also
claimed that his joke was not directed at the mosque because he did not know there
was one in that building and, somewhat inconsistently, that he didn’t know pork
products were offensive to Muslims.
Not buying Matthews’ claims, the court granted the government a preliminary
injunction against Matthews and ordered him to stay away from the mosque.8 The FBI
decided not to file federal charges shortly thereafter. By all accounts, Brent Matthews
complied with the terms of the injunction, learned his lesson, and moved on with his
life. Mosque members said that they forgave Matthews for his actions and considered
it an isolated event.9 But, on April 21, 2007, Matthews drove to the parking lot of a
local store, called 911, and threatened to kill himself.10 Officers tried to speak to
Matthews, but shortly after their arrival Matthews shot and killed himself, leaving no
note or explanation behind—a troubling end to a troubled life.
Brent Matthews’ story provides a vivid illustration of what a state attorney general
can do if given the authority to seek civil remedies against those who commit hate
crimes. In these states, attorneys general are able to move swiftly and craft orders that
enjoin and prohibit hateful activities with great specificity.11 However, allowing the
government to enjoin an individual from interacting with certain people, saying certain
things, and going certain places without the rigor of a criminal trial raises serious
constitutional questions. How broad should an attorney general’s powers be? What
actions justify their intervention?
This Article will look at the experiences of the eight states that have given their
attorneys general this authority and determine whether they serve as a model that other
jurisdictions should follow. Part II provides background and discusses the authority
of state attorneys general acting as parens patriae of its citizens. Part III looks
specifically at the laws and discusses how attorneys general’s offices have wielded this
authority. Part IV attempts to reconcile the states’ experiences with enforcing this type
of regulation and discusses at common trends that emerge. Part V examines possible
constitutionality problems with this civil hate crime regulation, with a focus on the
permissibility of punishing hate speech and the constitutionality of injunctions as a
restraint on prior speech. Finally, Part VI recommends a course of action for states
interested in adopting similar legislation in the future.

6. David Hench, Man Asked Cop About ‘Joke’, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Aug. 8, 2006, at A1.
7. Id.
8. Tice, supra note 1, at A8.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Although there are many different names for a crime motivated by the hatred of a victim’s
characteristic, such as “bias-motivated crime” and “civil rights crime,” I use the term “hate crime”
throughout this paper to connote these crimes.
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II. AUTHORITY OF THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
In America, every state has an attorney general who is designated that state’s chief
legal officer.12 The attorney general’s specific duties and responsibilities are often
amorphous because state law provides only that the attorney general may “perform
duties ‘prescribed as law’” or exercise powers given to the office in common law.13
Even more broadly, some states have entrusted their attorney general simply with the
broad common law power of parens patriae—meaning parent of the state. In some
states, the attorney general has the statutory authority to bring “consumer protection,
environmental, civil rights, civil fraud, securities, and antitrust actions; some offices
are also charged with maintaining oversight over public lands and charitable trusts.”14
In addition, many attorneys general play a role in enforcing criminal laws by either
prosecuting criminals directly or supervising law enforcement officials. Most attorneys
general also provide legal services to the governor and state agencies.15
In order for a state attorney general to assert standing under the doctrine of parens
patriae, “the State must assert an injury to what has been characterized as a ‘quasisovereign’ interest, which is a judicial construct that does not lend itself to a simple or
exact definition.”16 Although the Supreme Court declined to define quasi-sovereign
interest in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, the Court observed that there
are two categories of qualifying interests that emerge from case law. “First, a State has
a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and
economic—of its residents in general. Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest
in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system.”17 In
addition to a quasi-sovereign interest, the Court held that a State “must articulate an
interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more
than a nominal party.”18 The Court’s language in Snapp seems to imply that there is
some type of numerosity requirement to be met before the attorney general can act as
parens patriae, such that the office may not represent a private party merely to
vindicate that party’s private interest. The Court did not enunciate that a specific
proportion of the population must be affected, but it articulated some guidelines:
One helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and
welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is
whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address
through its sovereign lawmaking powers.19

Interpreting this language, the Court’s requirement turns on the type of injury,
rather than a requirement that a certain number of citizens be affected. Therefore, even

12. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?: Governors, State Attorneys General, and
Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2452 (2006).
13. Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General in
Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2002 (Dec. 2001).
14. Marshall, supra note 12, at 2452.
15. See Lynch, supra note 13, at 2002.
16. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
17. Id. at 607.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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if one person commits a crime against another person, the attorney general may act
under his or her authority of parens patriae as long as the crime affects the community.
On balance, because the state attorney general’s role is largely undefined and
subject only to the very loose constraints of the doctrine of parens patriae, states are
free to expand and experiment with the attorney general’s authority.
III. THE ROLE OF THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A. State Civil Rights or “Hate Crimes” Laws Generally
Although public awareness of the prevalence of hate crimes waxes and wanes, the
number of hate crimes remains consistently high. Between July 2000 and December
2003, there was an average of 191,000 hate crimes involving one or more persons
annually in the United States—about 3 percent of all crimes reported to the National
Crime Victimization Survey.20 84 percent of these incidents were accompanied by a
violent crime, such as robbery or assault, and the remaining 16 percent were property
crimes, such as burglary or theft.21 Of the 191,000 hate crimes, an average of about 44
percent (80,760) was reported to police.22 Of that 44 percent, police took action in 85
percent of cases—about 68,646 incidents.23 Breaking down hate crimes into categories
by type of bias, 55 percent were motivated by race; 31 percent were motivated by
association;24 29 percent were motivated by ethnicity; 18 percent were motivated by
sexual orientation; 14 percent were motivated by another perceived characteristic; 13
percent were motivated by religion; and 11 percent were motivated by disability.25
In order to address the problem of hate crimes, every state except Nebraska, Utah,
and Wyoming has enacted some form of hate crimes law, most of which are based on
model legislation drafted by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL).26 The ADL’s
approach penalizes hate crimes through a “penalty-enhancement” of an underlying
criminal offense, rather than the creation of an independent crime.27 Expressions of
hateful speech, without more, are not criminalized. Instead, hate crimes arise when an
individual commits a predicate illegal offense, such as assault, harassment or
vandalism, coupled with a motivation, at least in part, of underlying bias.28
There are three main justifications offered for penalizing hate crimes more harshly
than crimes. First, hate crimes have especially negative effects on the individual

20. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIMES REPORTED BY VICTIMS AND
POLICE 1 (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/hcrvp.pdf [hereinafter HARLOW].
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 4.
24. Hate crimes motivated by association are those where the victim is targeted because of her
association with someone who has a certain characteristic, such as a multiracial couple.
25. HARLOW, supra note 20, at 3. Note that the percentages add up to more than 100 percent because
victims could identify more than one category.
26. See Robert J. Kelly et al., Hate Crimes: Victimizing the Stigmatized, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL RESPONSES 23, 45-47 (Robert J. Kelly ed., 1993).
27. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE CRIMES LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 2 (1994) [hereinafter
ADL].
28. See JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HATE CRIME 12
(2002).
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because their victimization is tied up with their identity, which can create feelings of
anger and vulnerability.29 Second, hate crimes have especially negative effects on the
community as a whole because they can heighten hostilities between groups—perhaps
leading to violence—as well as increase fear and distrust generally.30 Third, “[t]he
expression of bias is an element, that is, at least analytically, severable from the crime
itself. . . . [T]he expression of bias has a meaning of its own that can produce negative
effects regardless of the seriousness of the associated crime.”31
Hate crimes are unusual in that motivation is a required element. Whether a crime
is motivated by hate is normally determined by the police officer investigating the
underlying crime. Establishing a bias motive is complicated by the fact that police
officers must determine why a crime has occurred, in addition to determining the facts
of the crime. This determination necessarily requires police officers to interpret
external actions to be evidence of internal motivation. Because of the difficulty in
doing so from an evidentiary perspective, officials place a great amount of weight on
what was said and what symbols were used, such as a swastika or a burning cross.32
These are not the only factors, however: officials may look at “the victim’s
perceptions, the victim’s identity (in the sense of whether the victim is publicly
recognized as a spokesperson for his or her group), whether the incident is part of a
pattern of acts, and when the incident occurs (e.g., on holidays with special religious,
racial or ethnic significance).”33 In the most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics Report,
nearly 99 percent of victims cited “[n]egative comments, hurtful words, [and] abusive
language” as evidence of underlying bias.34 Victims also cited evidence of hate
symbols and independent police confirmations in 8 percent of cases.35 As a practical
matter, without concrete and explicit examples of bias or hatred, it may be difficult for
police officers to recognize hate crimes and for attorneys general and prosecutors to
meet their burden of proof in court.
B. The Differences Between Civil and Criminal Hate Crime Prosecutions
State officials may choose to pursue civil remedies for hate crimes for a variety
of reasons. First, the burden of proof is less onerous for civil claims—usually a
preponderance of the evidence, compared with beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
cases.36 Second, a civil injunction is typically adjudicated more quickly than a criminal
case.37 Third, juveniles are subject to civil injunctions to a greater extent that they
would be subject to criminal sanctions.38 Lastly, civil injunctions can be permanent,

29. See James Garofolo & Susan E. Martin, The Law Enforcement Response to Bias-Motivated Crimes,
in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 26, at 64-65.
30. See id. at 65-66.
31. Id. at 66.
32. Id. at 70.
33. Id.
34. HARLOW, supra note 20, at 3.
35. Id. Note that the percentages add up to more than 100 percent because victims included more than
one motivation or evidence of motivation.
36. Of the eight states studied in the paper, only the New Hampshire Civil Rights Act requires the State
to meet a clear and convincing burden of proof. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-B:2 (Supp. 2008).
37. See ADL, supra note 27, at 19.
38. See id.
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while stay away orders as part of a criminal prosecution normally only last for short
periods of time.39
In addition to the general advantages of civil prosecutions, there are specific
benefits to state attorneys general taking up a hate crime case. First, the victim often
has fewer resources to draw from, which means that claims for civil injunctions are
often not filed when available.40 Second, in some states the attorney general is held to
a lesser requirement for standing than private individuals, having to prove merely a
“public interest.”41 Lastly, there may be greater deterrent effects with the state’s
involvement because increased publicity sends a message that the state takes civil
rights violations seriously.
C. State Civil Rights Laws Delegating a Role to State Attorneys General
Of the eight states that have enacted civil hate crime legislation law, only five state
attorneys general have incorporated these laws into their programs to combat hate
crimes: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and West Virginia. The
attorneys general of the remaining three states—California,42 New Jersey,43 and

39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. at 20.
Id. at 19.
Id.
In 1976, California enacted the Ralph Civil Rights Act, which provides that all persons:
have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed
against their persons or property because of political affiliation, or on account of any
characteristic. . . , or position in a labor dispute, or because another person perceives them
to have one or more of those characteristics.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7(a) (2006). The characteristics protected by the Act are not listed in the statute, but
the California Legislature declared in its findings that the Act protected hate crime based on “race, color,
religion, or sex, among other things.” A.B. 2719, ch. 98 § 1, Legislative Counsel’s Digest (2000). In 2001,
the California Legislature passed an amendment that provides that the Attorney General, a district attorney,
or a city attorney may seek a civil penalty of $25,000, which is assessed individually against each person
violating the law and awarded to each person whose rights have been violated. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(a)
(2008). This amendment was authored by the California Attorney General’s Office based on the
inadequacy of existing law to incentivize victims to report hate crimes. The Attorney General testified that
despite his office’s efforts to inform the public about the Attorney General’s ability to bring a hate crime
claim, they were not very successful in getting requests for assistance even though they knew that hate
crimes were occurring. Cal. Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Comm. Analysis of A.B. 587, at 4 (Apr. 3, 2001).
Although the California Attorney General’s Office lobbied successfully for the 2001 amendments, the
Office rarely, if ever, civilly prosecutes hate crimes itself. Telephone Interview with Louis Verduzo,
Assistant Cal. Attorney Gen. (Jan. 3, 2007). Unlike other states, the California Attorney General has
concurrent jurisdiction and direct supervision over county attorneys, district attorneys, and sheriffs. See
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12550 (2006). Hate crimes are investigated and prosecuted by these agencies under
the guidance of the Attorney General’s Office, rather than the Office bringing cases itself. Telephone
Interview with Louis Verduzo, Assistant Cal. Attorney Gen. (Jan. 3, 2007).
43. The New Jersey hate crimes law, originally enacted in 1993, currently provides:
A person, acting with purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because
of race, color, religion, gender, handicap, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression,
national origin, or ethnicity, who engages in conduct that is an offense under the provisions
of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes, commits
a civil offense.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21(a) (West 2006). Notably, bias against persons because of their “gender
identification” was not included in the 1993 legislation and was recently added to the enumerated
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Pennsylvania44—have yet to incorporate these laws into their civil rights initiatives.
This Part, therefore, focuses on the five states that are actively using civil hate crime
prosecutions.
1. Maine
The Maine Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1989 in direct response to an increase
in hate group-related activity.45 Modeled on, and nearly identical to, the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act, the Maine Civil Rights Act provides:
Whenever any person, whether or not acting under color of law, intentionally
interferes or attempts to intentionally interfere by physical force or violence against
a person, damage or destruction of property or trespass on property or by the threat
of physical force or violence against a person, damage or destruction of property or
trespass on property with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of rights
secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States or of rights
secured by the Constitution of Maine or laws of the State or violates section 4684-B,
the Attorney General may bring a civil action for injunctive or other appropriate
equitable relief in order to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the rights
secured.46

In 1993, the Maine Legislature passed an amendment to the Civil Rights Act that
specified the categories of people specifically guaranteed to be free from violations of

categories. Telephone Interview with Benn Meistrich, Assistant Attorney of N.J. (Jan. 8, 2007); see also
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21(a) (West 2006). If a person violates the law, the “Attorney General, as parens
patriae, may initiate a cause of action . . . on behalf of any person or persons who have sustained injury to
person or property as a result of the commission of the civil offense.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21(c)
(West 2006). If the Attorney General shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a person has violated
the law, the perpetrator is liable for compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs to the State and/or private attorneys, injunctive relief to prevent further violations, and any additional
appropriate equitable relief. Id. § 2A:53A-21(d)(1)–(4). Prosecution of hate crimes in the New Jersey
Attorney General’s Office is divided between two separate divisions. The Division on Civil Rights brings
civil suits to protect and enforce anti-discrimination and harassment claims, the majority of which deal with
public accommodations and workplaces. Telephone Interview with Benn Meistrich, Assistant Attorney of
N.J. (Jan. 8, 2007). The Division on Criminal Justice, which includes the Office of Bias Crime and
Community Relations (OBCCR), brings criminal actions against people who have committed hate crimes.
The Division on Civil Rights, which does not work with the Division on Criminal Justice or the OBCCR,
pursues injunctive relief in the event of a hate crime. Because of this bifurcated organization, it appears
that the Office rarely—if ever—uses the civil injunction provision to punish hate crimes.
44. The provision in the Pennsylvania civil rights law establishing a civil right of action for hate crimes
was enacted in 1990. The law provides that a district attorney or the Attorney General, “after consulting
with the district attorney,” may bring suit for injunctive or other equitable relief against a person who has
committed the crime of ethnic intimidation. 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8309 (West 2006). Ethnic intimidation
is defined as when a person commits a crime with malicious intent toward “the race, color, religion, or
national origin of another individual or group of individuals.” 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2710(a) (West 2006).
Although it has the statutory authority, the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office brings few—if any—
cases under the civil rights law. Instead, the Office refers complaints to the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission, a district attorney, or other state and federal agencies. See Office of the Pa. Attorney Gen.,
Civil Rights Division, http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/complaints.aspx?id=462 (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
45. See Christopher Parr, Comment, The Maine Civil Rights Act: History, Enforcement, Application,
and Analysis, 53 ME. L. REV. 189, 194 (2001).
46. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4681(1) (2002).
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their civil rights.47 As amended, the Civil Rights Act protects people from violence or
property damage motivated by their “race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, national
origin, physical or mental disability or sexual orientation.”48 When a hate crime
occurs, the statute authorizes the Maine Attorney General’s Office to file a suit for an
injunction, a civil penalty of up to $5,000, and reimbursement of attorneys’ fees.49 A
perpetrator who violates an injunction or consent decree issued under this section is
guilty of a class D crime—punishable by up to a year in jail.50
The Maine Attorney General’s Office vigorously and frequently prosecutes hate
crimes. Every year, the Office receives about 250 reports of possible hate crimes and
brings suit in about ten to fifteen cases.51 Since the law was enacted, the Office has
successfully obtained 275 injunctions, only seven of which have ever been violated.52
The Office has never lost a case against the alleged perpetrator of a hate
crime—perhaps because they are selective in which cases they prosecute and only
bring cases that they are reasonably sure they can prove.53 The average perpetrator of
a hate crime in Maine is a white male between the ages of fourteen and seventeen, and
the most common type of hate crime is motivated by race or color, followed by sexual
orientation.54
When the Attorney General’s Office civilly prosecutes a hate crime, the parties are
likely to agree on a resolution, which is reduced to a consent decree, rather than
proceed though the adjudicatory process. For example, between August 28, 1992 and
October 21, 1999, the Office brought eighty-six formal actions.55 From these actions,
135 defendants entered into consent decrees with the Office, “eight permanent
injunctions were issued, three default judgments were granted, . . . and one
order/decision was issued.”56 Many perpetrators choose not to retain private counsel
during this process and proceed pro se.57 Consent decrees are essentially contractual
agreements between the defendants and the State where the defendant agrees to a
course of conduct or non-conduct. Consent decrees normally last the lifetime of the
perpetrator and often contain boilerplate language that prohibits the perpetrator from
coming within a specified distance of the victim, from encouraging anyone else to
commit hate crimes, and from violating the civil rights of anyone in the
future—including a violation involving a different type of bias or victim.58 Thus, a
defendant who has committed a hate crime based on race is enjoined from violating the
civil rights of that person, anyone of the same race, and anyone else protected by the

47. See 2 Legis. Rec. House, H-1072-73 (1993).
48. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4684-A (2002).
49. Id. § 4681.
50. See Parr, supra note 45, at 193.
51. Telephone Interview with Thom Harnett, Assistant Me. Attorney Gen. (Dec. 22, 2006) [herinafter
Harnett].
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Parr, supra note 45, at 210 (citing Dep’t of Attorney Gen., Formal MCRA Actions Aug. 1992-Oct.
1999, at Table of Contents).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Harnett, supra note 51.
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statute. As used by the Maine Attorney General’s Office, consent decrees are designed
not only to stop the conduct directed at a single person but also at halting the offensive
conduct in the community-at-large. If a consent decree is violated, the perpetrator can
be prosecuted for the new hate crime as well as for violating the injunction.59
The case of State v. Dow is illustrative of the type of hate crimes the Office
prosecutes.60 In Dow, the defendant yelled racial slurs and threats, including “get out
and I will beat your black ass, you nigger, you whore, you slut,” at a pregnant twentyone-year-old African-American woman.61 Dow then threw a can of beer at the woman,
opened her car door, and kicked the woman in the arm and stomach.62 The Attorney
General’s Office brought suit against Dow, and the parties eventually entered into a
consent decree where Dow agreed to be permanently enjoined from assaulting,
threatening, intimidating, coercing, harassing, or attempting to do any of these things
to the victim, the victim’s family or anyone else, whether the bias be motivated by race,
religion, sex, etc.63 In addition, Dow is permanently enjoined from speaking to the
victim and her family, and from coming within a certain number of feet of the victim’s
home or place of employment. If Dow knowingly violates the consent decree, he is
liable for a fine of no more than $2,000 and no more than 364 days in jail.64
In addition to prosecuting offenders, the Maine Attorney General’s Office has
developed an educational program to prevent hate crimes and to educate citizens to
recognize hate crimes.65 To reach students, school administrators, and citizens, the
Office conducts free presentations at schools and workplaces.66 In 2006, the Office
conducted 144 of these presentations throughout the state.67 In addition, the Office
works with middle and high schools across the state to create civil rights teams, which
are composed of a faculty advisor and three students per grade, who receive training
about raising awareness of bias and prejudice at their schools.68 The goal of the teams
is to provide the student body with a support group of team members to whom students
can feel comfortable talking about harassment before it develops into a hate crime.69
Team members then pass this information on to school administrators or law
enforcement officials who can take appropriate action.70
The Maine Attorney General’s Office also trains police officers to enforce the
Civil Rights Act. Each new recruit receives a basic amount of training in civil rights

59. Id.
60. No. CV 06-72 (Me. Super. Ct, Hancock Cty., Sep. 15, 2006).
61. Complaint at 2-3, State v. Dow, No. CV 06-72 (Me. Super. Ct, Hancock Cty., Sep. 15, 2006).
62. Id. at 3.
63. See Consent Decree at 1-2, State v. Dow, No. CV 06-72 (Me. Super. Ct, Hancock Cty., Oct. 4,
2006).
64. See id. at 2-3.
65. The educational program is unusually prominent in the Maine Attorney General’s Office. In fact,
the title of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division is “Civil Rights Education
and Enforcement Officer.” Harnett, supra note 51.
66. Id. As this Article elaborates below, education in schools is especially important because most hate
crimes are committed by teenage boys.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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law while at the Maine State Police Academy.71 Additionally, most police departments
have a “Designated Civil Rights Officer” who is specially trained to identify biasmotivated crimes.72 This Officer then works as a liaison with the Attorney General’s
Office to investigate and prosecute hate crimes.73
2. Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1979 in response to a wave of
racially motivated violence.74 The Act provides:
Whenever any person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interfere
by threats, intimidation or coercion, or attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or
coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person or persons of rights
secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the
constitution or laws of the commonwealth, the attorney general may bring a civil
action for injunctive or other appropriate equitable relief in order to protect the
peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured.75

Because the Civil Rights Act does not enumerate the categories of people or rights
protected, it has been interpreted broadly to apply to “threats, intimidation, or coercion
on basis of his or her protected category (race, national origin, religion, age, gender,
sexual orientation or disability); or protected activity (for example, the right to vote or
the right to associate).”76 The Civil Rights Act notably does not provide for a victim
to collect damages in a suit under the Act—it provides merely for injunctive or
equitable relief. If a victim wants to file a claim for damages, he must hire a private
attorney. A violation of an injunction issued under the Civil Rights Act is a criminal
offense, and the violation is punishable:
by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than
two and one-half years in a house of correction, or both such fine and imprisonment;
provided, however, that if bodily injury results from such violation, the violation shall
be punishable by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars or by imprisonment for
not more than ten years, or both.77

The Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office receives complaints of civil rights
violations from both police and victims themselves. If the Office decides to pursue a
case, it works with the local police department to investigate.78 If a victim does not
want to testify, she may prepare a written statement under oath, which the Office can

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Virginia Nia Lee, Legislative Responses to Hate-Motivated Violence: The Massachusetts
Experience and Beyond, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 287, 290 (1990).
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11H (West 2007).
76. Office of the Attorney Gen. of Mass., http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=cagoterminal&L=2&L0=
Home&L1=Civil+Rights&sid=Cago&b=terminalcontent&f=civilrights_hate_crimes&csid=Cago (last
visited Apr. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Mass. Attorney Gen. Website].
77. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11J (West 2007).
78. See Mass. Attorney Gen. Website, supra note 76.
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present to receive an injunction.79 Although there is no current data available
regarding the annual number of civil prosecutions, from 1982 to 1989 the Office
received “eighty-four injunctions against 233 defendants in hate-motivated violence
cases” around the state.80
A recent case illustrates how the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office is
enforcing the Civil Rights Act. In 2005, the Office obtained an injunction against a
Sharon Brunelle for verbally assaulted four men—two of them gay—using anti-gay
slurs and violent threats.81 According to the Office’s complaint, Brunelle shouted antigay slurs at her downstairs neighbors, who were two gay men, as they ate dinner in
their backyard. When another neighbor tried to intervene on behalf of the two men,
Brunelle threatened to “kill and beat the two gay men, the next door neighbor and
another man visiting next door,” all while yelling anti-gay slurs.82 The injunction
prohibits Brunelle from “threatening, intimidating or coercing any of the four male
victims, or anyone else in the Commonwealth, on the basis of their actual or perceived
sexual orientation.”83 In addition, Brunelle must stay a minimum of 15 feet away from
the victims at home, 150 feet away from the victims elsewhere, and 500 feet away from
the victims’ place of employment; not communicate with the victims in any way; not
handle the victims’ mail; not bang or make excessive noise at night; and “stop imitating
or using gestures of stereotypical gay male movements.”84
In addition to prosecuting hate crimes, the Office also works with students,
teachers, and school administrators to reduce and prevent hate crimes from occurring
in schools. In 2004, the Office produced a brochure educating students about what
constitutes a hate crime, harassment, and discrimination, and telling students what they
should do (and who to contact) if they believe they have been a victim.85 In 2006, the
Office launched a pilot program in three school districts to reduce bullying motivated
by bias. The program, called the Safe Schools Initiative, was created after attorneys in
the Attorney General’s Office, school administrators, and parents noted an increase in
the number of reports of bullying or harassment where the perpetrator used hateful
language.86 According to an attorney in the Office’s Civil Rights Division, bullying
using “anti-Semitic, antigay and lesbian language” was pervasive.87 The Office is
working with schools and community groups to “interview parents and students,
convene focus groups, and collect statistics about the number and type of incidents that
occur in each district to look for patterns and trends. Teachers, administrators, and

79. Id.
80. Lee, supra note 74, at 295.
81. See Mass. Attorney Gen.’s Office, AG Reilly Obtains Civil Rights Injunction Against a New
Bedford Woman Accused of Gay Bashing (October 27, 2005), available at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.
cfm?pageid=986&id=1514.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Jospeh LaPlante, Woman Ordered to Stop Abuse of Gay Couple, THE STANDARD-TIMES, Oct. 8,
2005, at A7, available at: http://www.southcoasttoday.com/daily/10-05/10-28-05/a07lo194.htm.
85. See MASS. ATTORNEY GEN.’S OFFICE, ERASING HATE: A GUIDE TO YOUR CIVIL RIGHTS IN SCHOOL:
YOUR RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, AND HATE-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE (2004),
available at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/filelibrary/erashate.pdf.
86. See Megan Woolhouse, State Targets Bullies, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2006, at Globe West 1.
87. See id.
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other staff members will be schooled in the legal distinctions among bullying,
harassment, and hate crimes.”88 In addition, schools in the program are required to
report all incidents, regardless of severity.89
3. New Hampshire
The New Hampshire Civil Rights Act was enacted in 2000 as a result of the efforts
of the former New Hampshire Attorney General Philip McLaughlin, who asked his
assistant attorneys general to draft hate crime legislation when he came into office.90
The Civil Rights Act provides:
All persons have the right to engage in lawful activities and to exercise and enjoy the
rights secured by the United States and New Hampshire Constitutions and the laws
of the United States and New Hampshire without being subject to actual or threatened
physical force or violence against them or any other person or by actual or threatened
damage to or trespass on property when such actual or threatened conduct is
motivated by race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation,
gender, or disability. “Threatened physical force” and “threatened damage to or
trespass on property” is a communication, by physical conduct or by declaration, of
an intent to inflict harm on a person or a person’s property by some unlawful act with
a purpose to terrorize or coerce. 91

The Civil Rights Act further provides that it is a violation “for any person to interfere
or attempt to interfere with the rights secured by this chapter.”92 The New Hampshire
Attorney General may bring a civil action for an injunction whenever he or she has
probable cause to believe that the Act has been violated.93
As enacted, the Civil Rights Act differs from the one proposed by the Attorney
General’s Office in one major way. While most civil rights laws require the Attorney
General’s Office to prove the elements of their case with a preponderance of evidence,
the New Hampshire Civil Rights Act requires the Office to prove their case with clear
and convincing evidence.94 This language was inserted because the proposed Civil
Rights Act faced considerable opposition in the New Hampshire Legislature, and its
supporters were forced to make this compromise to assure its passage.95 New
Hampshire is the only state to place such a high burden on the Office. This burden is
especially difficult for hate crimes because of the uncertainty inherent in trying to
prove a perpetrator’s internal motivation.
The New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office rarely brings suit under the Civil
Rights Act. Since 2000, approximately three cases have been brought under the Act,
two of which involved school children and one which involved an adult.96 The

88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Telephone Interview with Anne Larney, Assistant N.H. Attorney Gen. (Dec. 28, 2006) [hereinafter
Larney].
91. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-B:1 (West Supp. 2008).
92. Id.
93. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-B:2 (West Supp. 2008).
94. Id.
95. Larney, supra note 90.
96. Id.
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Attorney General’s Office receives a “fair number of complaints”—the majority of
which come from the police, although some come from the victims themselves.97
When a complaint comes into the Office, a pair of assistant attorneys general will work
on it with a police officer or school resource officer—a police officer working directly
in the school—to investigate the incident.98 If the Office decides not to pursue a
complaint, it is usually because the Office lacks the requisite amount of proof of bias,
but infrequently it is because the victim is uncooperative.99 Although the Civil Rights
Act allows the Office to go forward without the cooperation of a victim, it usually will
not, either out of respect for the victim’s wishes or because without the victim’s
testimony there is insufficient evidence.100
Two cases involving minors in school are illustrative of the Office’s enforcement
efforts.101 In the first case, several students committed a hate crime against another
student based on racial animus. On the recommendation of the Office, the court issued
an injunction against the perpetrators from committing future hate crimes and ordering
them to write a paper on civil rights.102 In the second case, four to five middle school
children followed a classmate home and beat him up because of his perceived
homosexuality. All but one perpetrator entered into a consent decree with the Attorney
General’s Office, agreeing to stop the hateful conduct.103 The remaining perpetrator
chose to go to court with the support of his parents, and an evidentiary hearing was
held where the victim, the perpetrator, and four classmates—but not the co-perpetrators
—testified.104 The judge issued a bench order enjoining the perpetrator from further
hate crimes and ordering him to pay a fine, which he forbade the boy’s parents from
paying.105 In addition to the injunctions, all of the perpetrators were ordered to write
a paper on civil rights, which they had to read in front of a school assembly.106
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the New Hampshire Attorney General’s
Office has conducted three trainings on the law.107 Two of these trainings were
conducted for police officers and one was conducted for school administrators.108 In
terms of public education, the Office issues a press release and works with the local
newspapers to publicize any prosecutions, but there is no standing public education and
outreach program in place.109

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. In only one case has the Office brought suit without the victim’s cooperation, and in this case
the hate crime occurred in the presence of a teacher and a school police officer. The Office did not need
the student’s testimony and actually kept the name of the victim confidential. Id.
101. Although cases involving minors are sealed, attorneys in the Office may discuss their cases
generally so that one can get a sense of how the Office prosecutes cases. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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4. Vermont
The Vermont Hate Motivated Crime Statute was drafted by the Vermont Human
Rights Commission and the Attorney General’s Office at a time when there was a sharp
increase in the number of hate crimes.110 Based on the ADL’s model legislation, the
Vermont Attorney General considered the proposal “one of his top priorities for the
1990 legislative session. . . .[because he] believed that the penalty-enhancement
approach afforded criminal prosecutors a much needed weapon to aggressively pursue
hate crimes.”111 As enacted, the statute provides:
A person who commits, causes to be committed or attempts to commit any crime and
whose conduct is maliciously motivated by the victim’s actual or perceived race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, service in the armed forces of the
United States, handicap as defined by 21 V.S.A. § 495d(5), sexual orientation or
gender identity [is guilty of a hate crime.]112

For the purpose of enforcement, the Statute defines plaintiff as either “the attorney
general or a complainant.”113 A victim “suffering damage, loss or injury as a result”
of a hate crime may bring suit for “injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive
damages, costs and reasonable attorneys fees, and other appropriate relief against any
person who engaged in such conduct.”114 In contrast, the Attorney General may seek
an injunction,115 a civil penalty of not more than $5,000, and costs and reasonable
attorneys fees.116
The Vermont Attorney General’s Office assists victims who wish to seek
injunctive relief on their own, and the Office civilly prosecutes perpetrators
independently.117 When a victim wishes to proceed independently, the judge can, and
sometimes will, recommend that the victim contact the Attorney General’s Office,
which will offer its help.118 In recent years, the role of the Attorney General’s Office
in enforcing the Statute has decreased because state prosecutors have begun to
criminally prosecute hate crimes more quickly, including seeking temporary restraining
orders.119 When awarded quickly, a temporary restraining order obviates the need for
a civil injunction under the statute. The Attorney General’s Office plays a larger role
in cases where the state prosecutor proceeds slowly, where the evidence is not clear
cut, or where the victims approach the Attorney General’s Office before a criminal
prosecution begins.120

110. See Erik B. FitzPatrick, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of the Vermont Hate Motivated Crimes
Statute in Light of the United States Supreme Court’s Decisions in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 18 VT. L. REV. 771, 792-93 (1994).
111. Id. at 793-94.
112. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. B, § 1455 (1999 & Supp. 2008).
113. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. B, § 1458(5) (Supp. 2008).
114. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. B, § 1457 (1999 & Supp. 2008).
115. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. B, § 1461 (Supp. 2008).
116. Id. § 1466 (Supp. 2008).
117. Telephone Interview with Sandra Everitt, Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights (Dec. 29, 2006)
[hereinafter Everitt Interview].
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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In an average year, the Office conducts far more investigations into potential hate
crimes than it brings to court. If the Office decides not to file a suit, it is commonly
because there is no clear identification of the perpetrator, or the hateful actions do not
rise to the level of a crime.121 In 2007, eleven individuals contacted the Attorney
General’s Office, and ten of those complaints were investigated.122 Of these
complaints, five involved crimes motivated by sexual orientation, two involved race,
one involved religion, and two involved national origin.123 After investigating these
complaints, the Office did not file a single civil injunction, for a variety of reasons. In
several instances, the victim requested that the Office not pursue the complaint.124 In
two instances the victims initiated private legal proceedings, which achieved the
desired protection.125 In the remaining cases, either the conduct did not establish
criminal liability, or the perpetrator could not be identified.126
In its most recent report, the Office reported a decrease in the number of referrals
concerning hate and bias-motivated crimes over the past three years.127 The Office
theorized several reasons for this decrease. First, Vermont anti-harassment laws
require school administrators to intervene before conduct escalates to the level of a
hate crime.128 These programs could have caused a decrease in the number of incidents
in schools. Second, the Office has implemented a comprehensive education program
for all Vermont law enforcement personnel, so they are better able to prevent incidents
and counsel victims. Third, community and advocacy groups have conducted education and awareness training in targeted populations, leading to earlier intervention.129
To date, all of the suits brought by the Office have resulted in a consent injunction
at the hearing stage.130 These injunctions are confidential and usually include
provisions mandating counseling, treatment and community service for the perpetrator,
and in cases where the perpetrator is a minor, the record is sealed and protected.131 As
a result, the Office does not publicize when it brings a claim. Although barred from
disclosing the details of its prosecutions, in its 2005 report to the Vermont Legislature,
the Office briefly discussed the two cases it brought in 2004. In the first case, the
Office obtained an injunction against an offender for a crime motivated by the victim’s
perceived sexual orientation.132 The Office also reported that it successfully enforced
the consent decree when it was subsequently violated.133 In the second case, the Office

121. Id.
122. SANDRA EVERITT, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF VT., REPORT TO THE VERMONT
LEGISLATURE: HATE/BIAS MOTIVATED CRIMES 1 (2008), http://www.atg.state.vt.us/upload/1200689230
_2008_Hate_Crime_Report_to_the_Vermont_Legislature.pdf [hereinafter EVERITT, HATE/BIAS CRIMES].
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. EVERITT, HATE/BIAS CRIMES, supra note 122.
131. Id.
132. SANDRA EVERITT, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF VT., REPORT TO THE VERMONT
LEGISLATURE: HATE CRIMES 1 (2005), http://www.atg.state.vt.us/upload/1110459031_2005_Report_
to_the_Vermont_Legislature.pdf.
133. Id.
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assisted a parent in filing an action on behalf of her child, who was the victim of a hate
crime motivated by race.134 On her behalf, the Office obtained “an injunction against
one individual and assisted in a mediated resolution of the case with a second
offender.”135
In addition to bringing cases, the Vermont Attorney General’s Office also trains
police officers to prevent, recognize, and investigate hate crimes.136 In 2007, the
Office conducted two full-day trainings for all new police recruits at the Vermont
Criminal Justice Training Council facility.137 The Office also made a presentation to
county prosecutors about the prosecution of hate and bias-motivated crimes.138
5. West Virginia
The West Virginia Human Rights Act was amended in 1998 to allow the Attorney
General to bring a civil action
whenever any person, whether or not acting under the color of law, intentionally
interferes or attempts to interfere with another person’s exercise or enjoyment of
rights secured by this article or article eleven-a of this chapter, by actual or threatened
physical force or violence against that person or any other person, or by actual or
threatened damage to, destruction of or trespass on property.139

The categories of bias protected by the Human Rights Act are listed explicitly and
include “race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation or
disability,” and any other categories of bias which the courts find to be protected under
the broader Human Rights Act.140 In a civil action under the Human Rights Act, the
Office may seek an injunction or other equitable relief, a civil penalty of no more than
five thousand dollars per violation, or both.141 If a person knowingly violates an
injunction issued under the Human Rights Act, he or she is subject to a fine of not
more than five thousand dollars, imprisonment for up to a year in jail, or both.142
When the Human Rights Act was first implemented, the West Virginia created a
Hate Crimes Task Force, which is made up of state, local, and federal agencies, and
organizations, including the West Virginia Attorney General’s Office.143 The Task
Force’s overarching goal is to prevent and respond to hate crimes using a multidisciplinary approach with the support of all of its members.144 The Attorney General’s
authority to seek an injunction or civil penalty is part of this broader program.145 Since

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. EVERITT, HATE/BIAS CRIMES, supra note 122, at 2-3.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 3.
139. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-20 (2008).
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. W. VA. HATE CRIMES TASK FORCE, ANNUAL REPORT, at Appendix A1-2 (2002) (on file with
author) [hereinafter W. VA. ANNUAL REPORT].
144. Id. at 1-2.
145. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-20(b)(1)-(2) (2008).
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1998, the Office has handled about a “handful of cases a year” and has obtained
injunctions in a total of ten cases.146
One prosecution of a race-motivated hate crime is illustrative of the Office’s
enforcement efforts. In 2004, the Office brought suit against a man named Romie
Dailey, who threatened and attempted to stop a biracial couple from moving next door
to him.147 Dailey told the couple and others that “Ain’t no niggers going to live there”
and brandished a gun at them.148 Dailey also told the man selling the house to the
biracial couple, “I’m going to kick your nigger-loving ass.”149 After a hearing, the
court entered a preliminary injunction, which Dailey violated by assaulting the AfricanAmerican man who was, by then, residing with his fiancée next door.150 The parties
entered into a consent decree which ordered Dailey to pay a fine of $500, enjoined
Dailey from committing further hate crimes against the victims or anyone else,
contacting the victims, “using the term ‘nigger’ to refer to [the African-American
neighbor he assaulted] or the term ‘nigger lover’ to refer to [his fiancée] or her family
members[,]” and ordering Dailey to attend anger management classes.151 In addition,
Dailey was permanently enjoined from returning to his “former” home or going within
a quarter-mile of the couple’s house, except to retrieve his personal possessions at a
time arranged with the victims’ attorney.152
In addition to prosecuting hate crimes, Task Force members, including the
Attorney General’s Office, have trained police officers to recognize and respond to
hate crimes; recommended that each police department appoint a Designated Civil
Rights Officer who will receive additional education and work with other Civil Rights
Officers across the state; educated teachers and administrators about how to prevent
hate crimes in school; created civil rights teams in schools made up of a group of
students trained to engage their classmates in a dialog about hate crimes; created and
publicized a toll-free number to report hate crimes and get referrals; held community
education sessions; and worked with the federal government to coordinate responses
to hate crimes.153
Although the Task Force was very active when the law was first passed in 1998,
it has become less so over time and now operates only minimally.154 The lapse in
coordination with police departments has proven to be a major problem for the
Attorney General’s Office because of high officer turnover. New officers may not
have been previously trained to look for hate crimes, and without this training, police
officers responding to multiple calls involving the same parties may not figure out that
there is a pattern of bias. As a result, the Office is trying to figure out how to get more

146. Telephone Interview with Paul Sheridan, Assistant W. Va. Attorney Gen. (Dec. 18, 2006)
[hereinafter Sheridan].
147. See Charles Shumaker, Settlement Reached in Civil Rights Case, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 21,
2004, at P2A.
148. Complaint at 3, State v. Dailey, No. 04-C-2248 (W. Va. Cir. Cty. Ct., Kanawha, Aug. 12, 2004).
149. Id.
150. See Consent Decree, State v. Dailey, No. 04-C-2248 (W. Va. Cir. Cty. Ct., Kanawha, Aug. 22,
2006).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See W. VA. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 2-11.
154. Sheridan, supra note 146.
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cases in the door. Assistant Attorney General Paul Sheridan believes that there are
more actionable incidents than cases brought by the Office, but victims and authorities
are not contacting the Office.155
Another issue affecting the efforts of the Office is implementing the Task Force’s
call for each police department to appoint a Civil Rights Officer. When the Task Force
first advocated for these officers, the Governor asked all police departments to
comply.156 However, the Governor has direct control over only state police officers—
not county or city police departments, who do the majority of investigations.157
Therefore, the local police departments are free to disregard the Governor’s request
and are unaccountable to the Attorney General’s Office. This lack of authority,
combined with the Task Force’s neglect, has resulted in fewer departments appointing
a Civil Rights Officer, which may have also contributed to fewer cases being reported
to the Attorney General’s Office.
IV. LESSONS FOR STATES INTERESTED IN ADOPTING SIMILAR LEGISLATION
Despite differences in size and organization of state attorneys’ general offices,
there are several common themes that emerge when comparing their experiences.
First, there is a universal use of consent decrees and consent injunctions in place of
adjudicatory proceedings. This approach may be the result of economics—attorneys’
general offices tend to have scant resources and few staff members. When asked,
assistant attorneys general in Maine and New Hampshire explicitly cited a lack of
resources as one of the biggest hindrances for their Offices in vigorously prosecuting
more hate crimes. Overworked assistant attorneys general may simply not have the
time to prosecute every violation to judgment. This is not to say that if attorneys’
general offices had unlimited resources that they would prosecute every case to
judgment. The issue is that assistant attorneys general need enough resources to
prosecute cases quickly and move on to the next one.
Another explanation for the use of consent decrees may be that perpetrators are
often unrepresented by attorneys, either because they cannot afford an attorney, they
choose not to hire one, or they want to settle as soon as possible. It is also possible that
the social stigma of being a hate monger is so strong that perpetrators prefer to settle,
rather than have their conduct be a matter of public record. This justification is
especially strong in the states that routinely agree to keep consent agreements
confidential, such as Vermont. Whatever the reason, the result of an attorney general’s
focus on consent decrees is a faster result for the victim—ensuring that they and others
will not be future victims of hate crimes.
The second trend is the use of boilerplate language that generally prohibits future
violations and protects the victim from the perpetrator in consent decrees. Boilerplate
language allows offices to spend less time on each case, although narrow tailoring to
the situation at hand may be lost. This also has the benefit of saving assistant attorneys
general scarce time and resources,.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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The third commonality is the increasing number of hate crimes committed by
minors in schools and the community at large. The average perpetrator of a hate crime
in nearly every state is a white teenage boy. Recognizing the danger that these
teenagers represent for the future, several states have started programs to train school
administrators to recognize and deal with hate crimes and harassment that can lead to
hate crimes. Several states like Massachusetts are trying to educate students directly
by conducting training in schools about hate crimes. Many attorneys general hope they
can prevent a lifetime of hate-filled conduct by early intervention.
The final trend is that offices are focusing on education, training and publicity, in
addition to merely bringing cases. Most offices train local police officers to recognize
and investigate hate crimes. As noted above, discovering evidence of bias can be
difficult if there is no physical evidence. Training police officers to ask the correct
questions and to be sensitive to the personal issues of hate crime victims will increase
the number and quality of cases the office can bring. Furthermore, attorneys’ general
offices commonly reach out to the public to educate and to publicize pending cases.
In Maine, assistant attorneys general travel to offices and rotary clubs to train the
public on how to recognize and prevent hate crimes. When filing a claim, most offices
work with the media to publicize the details of the incident and any punishment with
the hope that it will educate and deter future crimes. This approach seems to be
effective because those states, such as Maine and Massachusetts, who publicize the
resources and activities of their offices, receive far more complaints than those that do
not, such as West Virginia and New Hampshire.
On balance, these trends offer compelling reasons to other states interested in
giving their attorney general similar authority. The unique institution of the attorney
general is well-suited to prosecute such crimes because of its ability to use precious
resources as efficiently as possible and to combine prosecutions, education and
publicity to accomplish a broad policy goal.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HATE CRIME INJUNCTIONS
Having examined how attorneys’ general offices are using their authority, this Part
will address whether underlying hate crimes laws enacted by the states are permissible
regulations of speech and conduct under the First Amendment. It will first examine the
laws under the hate speech, fighting words, and hate crimes doctrine of the Supreme
Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,158 Wisconsin v. Mitchell,159 and Virginia v. Black.160
The Part will then focus on whether the use of injunctions for civil rights enforcement
is an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech. Lastly, this Part will explore the
extent to which the government can enter into an agreement with a defendant to
prohibit future conduct under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.

158. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
159. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
160. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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A. May States Enact Laws that Specifically Target Hate Crimes?
The U.S. Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of hate crime
legislation under the First Amendment in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. This case involved
a St. Paul ordinance that made it a crime to use any speech that could reasonably
arouse anger or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or
gender.161 The Court held that the statute was facially unconstitutional because it
prohibited speech solely on the basis of the viewpoint expressed.162 However, the
Court drew a distinction between content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination,
noting that while viewpoint-based discrimination is always unconstitutional, there are
certain types of content-based restrictions that have long been recognized as
constitutional.163 Thus, content-based discrimination is permissible when the speech
at issue is part of a class of speech that is normally proscribable, and the discrimination
is based on the “very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.”164 As
an example, the Court noted that a state could prohibit only the most offensive
obscenity, but it could not prohibit only the most offensive political obscenity.165 On
this basis, the Court held that the St. Paul statute was unconstitutional because it
applied only to fighting words that insult or provoke violence, due to the fact that they
express a view on a “disfavored subject.”166
Although the R.A.V. Court struck down a law that criminalized speech based on
its viewpoint, the Court shortly thereafter upheld a law increasing a criminal penalty
where the victim was chosen because of a personal characteristic in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell. This case involved a Wisconsin statute that increased the penalty for a crime
where the victim was selected because of their “race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry.”167 The Court distinguished R.A.V. on the
grounds that the statute there was explicitly directed at expression, whereas the
Wisconsin law was directed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment—here,
physical assault.168 Moreover, the Court noted that the State singled out hate crimes
because they are thought “to inflict greater individual and societal harm . . . . [and] are
more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their
victims, and incite community unrest.”169 Therefore, the Court held that the State had
an adequate justification for its penalty-enhancing provision in order to redress these
harms.
Taken together, R.A.V. and Mitchell hold that although states may enact laws that
provide for greater punishment of bias-motivated crimes, states may not enact laws that
punish otherwise non-criminal speech. Thus, if the state laws cited above are
constitutional, it must be because civil penalties for criminal acts are analogous to the
criminal penalties in R.A.V. This analogy seems especially appropriate because every
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162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
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R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379-80.
See id. at 382.
See id. at 387-88.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 391.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 481-82 (citing WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-1990)).
See id. at 487.
Id. at 487-88.
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state, excluding New Jersey, provides that a violation of a hate crime injunction is a
crime.170 Additionally, the Court’s rationale in Mitchell, that a penalty-enhancement
statute was constitutional because it focused on conduct rather than expression, seems
applicable in these cases. The laws cited above follow two general models. The first
model generally prohibits damage or trespass to property and the use of physical force
or violence against a person when motivated by hate.171 The second model prohibits
threats, intimidation, and coercion intended to prevent a person from enjoying or
exercising their constitutional rights.172 The first model is an easier fit with the
jurisprudence of R.A.V. and Mitchell and is, therefore, likely constitutional. However,
the second model seems to punish certain types of speech based on its effects on the
listener, which has far less support in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Because second model laws regulate speech rather than conduct, their
constitutionality is much more questionable than the first model. The Supreme Court
has long recognized that there are certain types of speech, including insulting or
fighting words, which may be prevented and punished without offending the First
Amendment.173 Over time, the Court has limited the fighting words doctrine to allow
regulation only of “those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the
ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke
violent reaction.”174 In the context of hate crimes, R.A.V. creates an additional
restriction that a statute punishing or prohibiting fighting words may not be limited to
certain types of fighting words, such as racial epithets. There, the Court held that
“[t]he government may not regulate use based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the
underlying message expressed.”175
In determining the constitutionality of the second model laws, the first question
to be answered is whether threats, intimidation, and coercion qualify as fighting words
and are subject to proscription. As a subset of fighting words, the Court has
consistently held that states can proscribe “true threats.”176 As articulated in Virginia
v. Black, a true threat “encompasses those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
to a particular individual or group of individuals.”177 In Black, the Court upheld a

170. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(d) (West 2006), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4681(6) (2002),
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11J (West 2007), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-B:4 (2006), 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 8309(b) (2006), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1465 (2007), W. VA. CODE § 5-11-20(e) (2008).
171. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 5-11-20(a) (2008) (providing that “[a] person has the right to engage in
lawful activities without being subject to” violence or damage to property).
172. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(d) (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 11J (West 2007); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21 (West 2006).
173. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem.”)
174. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (“[F]ree speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”)
175. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386.
176. See Watts v. United States, 392 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (“[T]hreats
of violence are outside the First Amendment.”).
177. 538 U.S. at 359.
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Virginia statute banning cross-burnings with the intent to intimidate, reasoning that
intimidation is a type of true threat because intimidation places the hearer in fear of
bodily harm or death.178 One can also use this reasoning to place coercion into the
category of true threats or fighting words, but only to the extent that coercion
intimidates the hearer into doing something against her will because she fears bodily
harm. With that proviso, the second model laws discussed above can be understood to
regulate fighting words.
Having determined that the second model laws regulate fighting words, the next
question is whether they permissibly do so. As discussed above, the R.A.V. Court
invalidated a St. Paul, Minnesota, law that prohibited fighting words—specifically
cross-burnings and Nazi swastikas—where the person should have reasonably known
it would cause alarm in a person based on “race, color, creed, religion or gender.”179
The Court distinguished the cross-burning in R.A.V. from those in Black on the ground
that it did not matter in Black what reason the perpetrator had for trying to intimidate
the victim.180 Therefore, if the second model hate crimes laws enumerate protected
classes, they are likely unconstitutional. The California and Massachusetts Civil
Rights Acts do not contain a list of protected classes within its text and are, therefore,
likely constitutional.181 The New Jersey hate crimes law, on the other hand, punishes
those who intend to intimidate people or engage in criminal conduct “because of race,
color, religion, gender, . . . sexual orientation or ethnicity.”182 This is similar to the
statute struck down in R.A.V., and to the extent it criminalizes intimidation of certain
groups of people, it is likely unconstitutional. If the intimidation language can be
severed from the law, the provision allowing for punishment for criminal conduct
motivated by hatred of a characteristic is similar to the first model of laws and would
likely be held constitutional.
On balance, the hate crimes laws enacted by the eight states examined in this
Article—with the possible exception of New Jersey—are likely constitutional attempts
by states to prevent and proscribe hate crimes. The Court’s decisions in R.A.V.,
Mitchell, and Black make clear that hate crime penalty-enhancing laws and contentneutral regulations of fighting words are constitutionally permissible.
B. Are Hate Crime Injunctions an Unconstitutional Prior Restraint?
As discussed above, states may enact hate crimes laws that allow their Attorney
General to civilly prosecute those people who committed criminal acts motivated by
bias or hatred of a victim’s characteristic. The more difficult question is to what extent
the Attorney General and the court may enjoin a perpetrator from future actions.
Because most hate crimes involve speech elements as well as actions, injunctions
crafted by courts necessarily prohibit or regulate both. However, the strong

178. Id. at 360. However, the Court ultimately reversed the conviction on the ground that Virginia’s
statutory provision unconstitutionally considered cross burning to be prima facie evidence of intent to
intimidate. Id. at 363-64.
179. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
180. Black, 538 U.S. at 362.
181. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12 § 11H (West 2007).
182. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-21 (West 2008).
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presumption against prior restraints on speech requires that courts be very careful in
tailoring injunctions.
The Supreme Court established the general presumption against prior restraints
on speech in Near v. Minnesota,183 where the Court struck down a permanent
injunction against publication of a newspaper. The Court held that the prohibition
against prior restraint applies in all but exceptional cases, such as where national
security is at risk.184 Because injunctions are prior restraints, they are, therefore,
presumptively unconstitutional when applied to speech. However, the Court has also
held that not all injunctions are impermissible.185 Injunctions will stand up to First
Amendment scrutiny if the order is “based on a continuing course of repetitive
conduct[,] . . . is clear and sweeps no more broadly than necessary,” and has not gone
into effect before the court has determined that the conduct in question is illegal.186
The requirements for injunctions on speech enunciated in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,187 operate to limit injunctions to
situations where the court has had a chance to hear evidence and is therefore in a better
position to craft an appropriately narrow injunction.188 Using the Pittsburgh Press test,
courts must evaluate injunctions on a case by case basis.
Under Near and its progeny, hate crime injunctions like those discussed in this
Article run into constitutional issues only to the extent they regulate speech
independent of action.189 The West Virginia case of State v. Dailey, discussed above,
illustrates the prior restraint question. Although Dailey actually ended in a consent
decree, for the purposes of illustration, I will suppose it ended in an injunction. In that
case, Dailey was enjoined from committing hate crimes against the victims or anyone
else in the future, contacting the victims, using the term ‘nigger’ to refer to the AfricanAmerican neighbor he assaulted or the term ‘nigger lover’ to refer to the neighbor’s
Caucasian fiancée or her family members, and ordering Dailey to attend anger
management classes.190 Although the injunction was, in fact, based on a continuing
course of conduct because Dailey had violated previous injunctions, the requirements
that Dailey not use the terms ‘nigger’ or ‘nigger lover’ likely sweep more broadly than
necessary to ensure that Dailey refrain from committing hate crimes in the future, thus
failing the Pittsburgh Press test.191 One can easily imagine a case where Dailey could
commit a hate crime without using any offensive speech, or a situation where he uses
offensive speech which results in no hate crime. Furthermore, the Near Court

183. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
184. Id. at 715-16.
185. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973).
186. Id.
187. 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973).
188. This narrow and careful tailoring is important given the collateral bar rule’s requirement that a party
obey a court order until the court has invalidated it, or the party loses the chance to challenge the order.
See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
189. As discussed above, most actions brought by attorneys general offices actually end in consent
decrees, rather than injunctions. Although this Note discussed the two as if they were analogous in
preceding sections, they are discussed separately here because the constitutional questions are slightly
different.
190. Consent Decree, State v. Dailey, No. 04-C-2248 (W. Va. Cir. Cty. Ct., Kanawha, Aug. 22, 2006).
191. See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 390.
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established a very narrow window in which speech injunctions are constitutional, and
hate speech does not threaten national security or present any great danger of the type
contemplated by the Court.192 Finally, the injunction runs afoul of the Court’s decision
in R.A.V. because a person cannot be punished solely for using racial epithets.193 A
prosecution for a violation of an injunction prohibiting speech protected under R.A.V.
would be unconstitutional.
Thus, courts and attorneys general face a constitutional roadblock in prohibiting
hate speech with injunctions. The Court’s jurisprudence places a very high presumption against prior restraints on speech that one would be hard pressed to think of a
situation where the prohibition would survive Pittsburgh Press, Near, and R.A.V.
Therefore, unless a court can tie speech to a specific crime, such as threatening or
coercing someone, injunctions on speech will likely be struck down as
unconstitutional.
C. When Do Consent Decrees Impose Unconstitutional Conditions?
In most hate crime cases brought by attorneys’ general offices, the office comes
to an agreement with the defendant on a set of prohibitions on future conduct, rather
than proceeding through the full adjudicatory process. In these consent decrees,
defendants agree to cease their hateful conduct and sometimes to undergo some sort
of therapy or counseling. Although consent decrees contain many of the same
conditions and terms that courts put into an injunction, the analysis of their
constitutionality turns on slightly different grounds because the defendant is entering
into a quasi-contract with the government. Therefore, the question then becomes what
conditions the defendant is allowed to agree with and what rights he may waive. The
doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions” broadly holds that the government may not
offer anyone “a benefit that it is constitutionally permitted but not compelled to offer,
on condition that the recipient undertake (or refrain from) future action that is legal for
him to undertake (or to refrain from) but that government could not have
constitutionally compelled (or prohibited) without especially strong justification.”194
In practical terms, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions forbids the government
from doing indirectly what it cannot do directly. Thus, the court generally may not
allow the government to impose conditions on a defendant in a consent decree that it
could not impose in an injunction.
When applying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to government action,
the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between penalties for exercising a right and
a mere refusal to subsidize the exercise of a right.195 Although the latter is allowed, the
former must meet a higher standard of review to escape invalidation. For example, in
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,196 the Court upheld a ban on
lobbying for tax-exempt organizations on the basis that the government could choose

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See Near, 283 U.S. at 715-16.
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1427 (1989).
See id. at 1420.
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not to subsidize lobbying.197 Although the Court’s jurisprudence in this area is
arguably not a model of clarity, it seems as though in order for a penalty to survive a
constitutional attack, the government regulation must be “narrowly tailored to serve a
substantial governmental interest.”198 Therefore, the Court held that an FCC regulation
banning all editorializing from government subsidized public television stations was
an unconstitutional condition because the ban was overbroad relative to the
government’s interest in disavowing association with editorial content.199
In the context of criminal law, the Court has broadly interpreted what qualifies as
a benefit. For example, the Court has held that a plea bargain is a benefit, either to
receive a lesser sentence200 or to escape criminal liability completely.201 Hate crime
consent decrees are analogous to plea bargains in that the defendant benefits from not
going through the adjudicatory process in favor of a definite and immediate outcome.
Therefore, courts may treat consent decrees like plea bargains and hold them to be
benefits. However, this issue remains undecided, as no court has been presented with
this issue. If consent decrees are treated like plea bargains, the Supreme Court has held
that defendants can only waive constitutional rights if the waiver is the product of an
informed and voluntary decision.202 In terms of which constitutional rights may be
waived, the Court has been more willing to allow defendants to waive rights related to
trial, such as the right to appeal203 and the right to file a federal claim,204 rather than
rights which are unrelated or “not germane” to the benefit offered.205
If challenged, hate crime consent decrees are more likely to be categorized as
penalties for exercising a constitutional right. However, the constitutional right only
extends to the protected aspects of a hate crime, such as hate speech, not the violent
or illegal acts themselves. Therefore, the government would have to meet the higher
burden and show that an agreement—for example, not to call anyone a “nigger”—is
narrowly tailored to achieve a significant government interest.206 As discussed in the
previous section with regard to R.A.V., the Court has been unreceptive to government
claims that prior restraints on speech are necessary. Therefore, an agreement not to say
certain words because of their offensiveness is unlikely to be upheld by any court. In
addition, the requirement that a person refrain from using certain types of speech
would likely fail a germaneness test, as that applied in Nollan,207 because waiving the
right to freedom of speech is unrelated to trial. Thus, as with injunctions, consent
decrees that require defendants to waive their right to freedom of speech are likely
unconstitutional conditions that would be struck down by courts. However, to the

197. Id. at 540-41; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198-99 (1991) (holding that the federal
government could refuse to give federal funds to family planning organizations that offered abortion-related
information and services).
198. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
199. See id. at 402.
200. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1970).
201. See Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 394 (1987).
202. See id. at 393.
203. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752-53.
204. See Newton, 480 U.S. at 383.
205. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
206. See id.
207. See id.
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extent that consent decrees merely prohibit future illegal conduct or the exercise of
other rights not based in the Constitution, they are consistent with the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATES INTERESTED IN
ENACTING SIMILAR LEGISLATION
Based on the many benefits to victims and communities, this Article recommends
that every state enact legislation allowing its attorney general to seek injunctive and
equitable relief when a hate crime occurs. The benefits include faster awards of
injunctions, injunctions awarded in cases where the private victim would otherwise be
unable to secure private counsel, increased media attention because of the state’s
involvement and press activities, potentially lower burdens of proof, and higher rates
of success because of the attorney general’s expertise.
However, the states discussed in this Article have encountered pitfalls that future
states could avoid. First, it is important to work closely with police officers to identify
and investigate possible hate crimes. In the Maine case discussed in the Introduction,
a Lewiston police officer allegedly incorrectly informed the perpetrator that he would
only be guilty of littering if he threw a pig’s head into a mosque. Law enforcement
officers should receive hate crime trainings on a routine basis—if they are unable to
recognize the signs, they are unable to sufficiently protect the public from such
injustices.
Second, it is important to keep publicizing prosecutions and advertising the
attorney general’s resources to the public. The West Virginia Attorney General’s
Office has seen a decrease in the number of complaints receieved by the Office, even
though they believe hate crimes are occurring in the same numbers, because few
victims know to contact the Office. This is a result of almost no outreach to the public,
an unpublished hate crime hotline, and less training for police officers or school
officials in recent years. Because so many prosecutions by the attorney general’s office
occur in cases where the victim is otherwise unable to seek relief, it is important for the
office to advertise its availability to these victims.
Attorneys general looking to take on a new role in combating hate crimes in their
state can look to the eight states that currently have hate crime legislation for model
language. However, because of the possible First Amendment issues with the second
model of hate crime legislation, this Article recommends that states adopt language
similar to that used in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont.
In addition to statutory language, states should also take into consideration the
enforcement lessons learned by the five states with operating programs. First and most
importantly, the statute should explicitly provide the attorney general with the authority
to proceed on the behalf of the victim to the same extent that the victim could proceed
with a private attorney. For example, if the attorney general is unable to seek damages
where a private attorney could, fewer victims will bring their complaints to the office.
Second, the statute should specify the burden of proof to be a preponderance of
the evidence, rather than clear and convincing. The higher burden required by the New
Hampshire hate crime statute has resulted in fewer cases being brought by the Attorney
General’s Office because the evidence in many hate crimes is circumstantial and
equivocal. The preponderance of the evidence standard appropriately balances the
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interests of the perpetrator receiving a fair trial with the reality of the difficulty inherent
in proving a crime motivated by bias.
Third, the statute should provide for several remedies, including injunctions,
attorneys’ fees, compensatory and punitive damages, and any other appropriate
equitable relief. Without a financial incentive, many victims will not report hates
crimes to the office, preferring to deal with the incident informally. In addition, an
award of attorneys’ fees to the office can help reduce the financial strain under which
many of the offices operate. The ability to seek punitive damages is also important
because some hate crimes are heinous and offensive but do not result in significant
property or personal damage.
Finally, the five states discussed above have made extensive use of their ability to
seek other types of equitable relief. Allowing attorneys general to order students to
write papers or require adults to undergo sensitivity training can help prevent future
hate crimes in a way that an injunction cannot. In sum, a statute that incorporates these
elements will be a powerful tool for attorneys general who want to become involved
in reducing hate crimes in their states.
Unfortunately, enacting a statute is only half of the solution. As this Article
discussed, a vital element of any successful hate crime program is education and
training. In terms of education, attorneys’ general offices should work with schools,
offices, community organizations, and the press to educate citizens about what a hate
crime is and what options victims have. Because there have been an increasing number
of hate crimes in schools, it is especially important to educate students about their
liability and rights under the law. In terms of training, states should implement a
program that mandates hate crime training for police officers during their initial
training and on routine intervals thereafter. Though it may be helpful to appoint a
single officer to be in charge of recognizing hate crimes, it is the average police officer
responding to a call in the community who is best positioned to recognize biasindicators in an incident or a pattern of incidents. Therefore, it is imperative that all
officers understand how to recognize and investigate hate crimes. An Attorney
General’s Office that includes education and training in its program will, therefore, be
far more successful in enforcing its hate crimes statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
State attorneys general can play a valuable role in preventing and punishing hate
crimes by seeking injunctive and equitable relief. There are many benefits to giving
the attorney general the authority to act on behalf of a hate crime victim, the most
important of which is providing legal services to a person who may not be able to hire
a private attorney. But, there are additional benefits. Intervention by the Attorney
General can help bring publicity to a crime in a way that a private suit may not,
increasing the public awareness of the prevalence of hate crimes and the concomitant
penalties.
The experiences of the five states using this type of hate crime legislation have
been universally positive, if not perfect. But the success of any hate crime program
depends on the extent to which an office can get cases in the door. As states have
discovered, the keys to getting victims to bring their complaints to the attorney
general’s office are the ability to get damages, publicity of the office’s capabilities, and
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training of law enforcement officers to recognize hate crimes when they occur.
Attorneys general in other states who are looking for a way to reduce hate crimes in
their jurisdiction would benefit from adopting such a program and should look to the
experience of these states.

